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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Administrative Law-Parties on Appeal from Utilities CommissionRefusal to Take Judicial Notice of Interest of Affected
Municipality in Discontinuance of Train Service
The Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. petitioned the North Carolina
Utilities Commission for permission to discontinue certain trains and
passenger service in the eastern part of the state. The city of Kinston
and others' appeared in opposition to the petition. The petition was
allowed, and the protestants filed notice of appeal to the superior court.
Hearing that the railroad intended to discontinue the trains before the
appeal was heard, the' protestants filed a motion before the Superior
The protestants were the City of Kinston, the County of Lenoir, the City of
Greenville, the County of Pitt, the Eastern Carolina Chamber of Commerce, and

the Four County Committee. North Carolina Corporation Commission v. Kinston,
220 N. C. 359, 20 S. E. (2d) 322 (1942).
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Court of Edgecombe County for an order 2* directing the railroad to
cease and desist from all efforts to carry into effect the commission's
order. The railroad filed a counter motion to dismiss the protestants'
motion and to dismiss the appeal from the order of the Utilities Commission on the ground that the matter was not properly in the superior
court. However, the protestants' motion was granted, and the railroad
appealed. The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the motion
of the railroad to dismiss the protestants' appeal should have been
allowed on the ground that the protestants were not entitled to prosecute an appeal from the order of the commission, apparently because
the protestants had failed to show sufficient interest to warrant the
appeal. The court said that a party to a hearing must show some
property or property interest involved in order to have the right to
appeal. Judicial notice was not taken of the fact that the trains in
question operated within the protesting towns and counties. It was
said in the opinion, "We are not permitted to refer to matters not stated
in the record, nor could the court below or the jury consider them." 3
There is ample authority to support the position that the court will
take judicial notice of facts known to the general public4 when such
facts are material and necessary to the decision. 5 In general, a request
for judicial notice is necessary.O However, judicial notice has been
taken of the fact-that railroads operated within certain territories in
cases where neither the fact of the railroad's operation nor a request
was shown. 7
In spite of the lack of showing of a request in the principal case,
it is submitted that the court would not have been in error had it taken
judicial notice of the fact that the trains in question operated within
the protesting towns and counties. Thus the protestants' interest-the
passenger service to which they had been accustomed, and of which
they were being deprived-would have appeared. The action of the
" The railroad contended that even if this case were properly in the superior
court on appeal, the restraining order should not have been granted because:
1. The protestants should bring an independent action aghinst the railroad;
2. If the motion for the order was proper, it should be supported by verified complaint or affidavit; and, 3. The protestants should post bond to protect the railroad.
The railroad had presented affidavits to show that it would suffer serious loss if
the order were granted.
The petitioners argued that the order requested was not in the nature of an
injunction; that, after their appeal was perfected, the jurisdiction of the commission was shifted by law to the superior court, and there could then be no discontinuance of the trains until it was allowed by the court.
'The court was quoting from an opinion by Walker, J., in the case of State v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 149 N. C. 470, 475, 62 S.E. 755, 757 (1908).
' WIGmoRE, EviDENcE

(3d ed. 1940) §2571.

15 B. U. L. REv. 385.
'WIGmoaE, EVIDEN C (3d ed. 1940) §2568.
7Goodman v. Heilig, 157 N. C. 6, 72 S. E. 866 (1911) ; State ex rel. McCullen
v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 146 N. C. 568, 60 S.E. 506 (1908).
'Note (1935)
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court in the principal case is somewhat suggestive of the action in
Riggin v. Collier,8 where the court refused to recognize New Orleans
as a city in Louisiana.
However, the requirement that such an aggrieved municipality must
show a property interest seems to be only technical law serving no good
end. If, as in the instant case, such law is going to lead to the denial
of protection to a city's interest in its transportation, then that law
would be better abolished. The state of the law in North Carolina,
since the principal case, would appear to be that neither individual
citizens of a community nor the community itself may appeal from an
order of the commission. Such law is opposed to the best interest of
the public.
In support of that position in the principal case, the railroad cited
North Carolina CorporationCommission v. Winston-Salem Southbound
Railroad Co.9 That case did hold that the citizens of Winston-Salem
had no right to appeal from a proceeding before the commission regarding the relocation of a depot. The fact, however, was apparently
overlooked by the railroad in the principal case that the Winston-Salem
Railroad case involved the entirely different problem of the right of
individual citizens to appeal. The principal problem is the right of
cities and counties, the legal representatives of their people, to appeal.
The court in the Winston-Salem Railroad case argued, as does the
railroad in the principal case, that C. S. §1097 confines the right of
appeal from an order of the commission to a party to the proceeding,
that to be a party a property interest must be shown, and that the
intervenors showed no such interest. They were affected only as citizens of the community and had no more interest than other citizens
who opposed the removal of the depot. The law does not authorize
individual citizens to prosecute an appeal when they have no interest in
the subject matter except that which is common to all. That right,
10
argued the court, is reserved to the state which acts for all its citizens.
To allow such an appeal, it was said, would be to destroy the purpose
of the commission, i.e., instead of decisions by the commission, we
would have decisions by a jury in the locality of the complainant. However, the fact was ignored that this argument is equally applicable where
86 Mo. 568 (1839); Note (1922) 25 LAw NoTEs 226.
p170 N. C. 560, 87 S. E. 785 (1916).
10* N. C. CODE AxN. (Michie, 1939) §1908: "The cause shall be entitled
'State of North Carolina on relation of the utilities commissioner against (here
insert name of appellant)..'..
In Chief Justice Clark's dissenting opinion in North Carolina Corporation
Commission v. Winston-Salem Southbound Railroad Co., 170 N. C. 560, 572, 87
S. E. 785, 791 (1916), he said, "The mere form of docketing is nothing more
than a formality. The real plaintiffs are the petitioners whose property rights

have been damaged... and who are entitled to have a jury pass on the question"
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the appeal is by the railroad. It would appear that the result of the
decision in this case was to deprive the injured protestant of the right
of judicial review of an order refusing him relief, and, on the other
hand, to afford the railroad every opportunity of review.
The case of Southern Public Utilities Co. _v. Charlotte" weakens
the Winston-Salem Railroad case as a precedent against an appeal by
a municipality. There the right of the City of Charlotte to appeal from
an order of the corporation commission allowing an increase of streetcar fares in the city was sustained. Justice Hoke, writing the opinion,
said, speaking of the Winston-Salem Railroad case, "I think I may
safely say that none of the court entertained the view that the right of
appeal in such cases is necessarily restricted to the state and the defendant corporation whose interests are adversely affected."
The Winston-Salem Railroad case is further weakened as a precedent for the railroad in the principal case by a split in the court there
on the matter of the right to appellate review. Two justices, Brown and
Walker, were of the opinion that there was no such right. This position was incorporated in the majority opinion written by Justice Brown.
Two justices, Hoke and Allen, concurred in the result only. Justice
Allen made no statement of his opinion, but Justice Hoke felt that
there was a right of appeal, and Chief Justice Clark dissented on that
ground. Thus, if Justice Allen's silence is overlooked, there is an even
split in the court over the question of whether the protestants had. a
right to appeal. If, however, Justice Allen's silence can be interpreted
to mean that he concurred in the result only, or that he coficurred in
the opinion of Justice Hoke, this case could be said to be an authority
against the position of the railroad.
In Chief Justice Clark's dissenting opinion, he pointed out that
the General Assembly has provided 12 that "either party affected" could
appeal, and since it would indeed be a solecism for the commission to
appeal from its own order, this must mean that the right to appeal is
not restricted to the corporation whose interest is affected. However,
it should be noted that the statute to which the Chief Justice referred
is concerned with appeals to the supreme court and not to the superior
court, but a similar provision is made in a statute on" appeals to the
superior court.' 3
It is apparent that there is more reason for refusing to allow an
1179 N. C. 151, 166, 101 S. E. 619, 626 (1919).

N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1100: "Either party may appeal to the
supreme court from a judgment of the superior court, and the same rules and
'

regulations are prescribed by law for appeals...."
1 N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1939) §1097: "From all decisions or determinations made by the utilities commissioner, any party affected thereby- shall be

entitled to an appeal.. .. "
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appeal by an individual citizen than by a municipality. The argument
most generally heard against appeals by individuals is that they would
tend to flood the courts with litigation. However, this argument is
hardly realistic in view of the expense involved. If an occasional suit
by a vigilant citizen were allowed, it might well result in a better protection of the public interest.
Even if it were conceded that the words of C. S. §1097,14 giving the
right of appeal "to any party affected," constituted a limitation, then
that limitation was removed by C. S. §1112(k),'r ° giving the right of
appeal "to any party ... to the proceeding."
As another basis for a more desirable result in the principal case,
it is suggested that the court could have held the railroad estopped, by
failure to object earlier in the proceeding, from claiming that the
16
protestants had no sufficient interest.
Possibly the best solution to the present uncertain state of the law
in North Carolina is to be found through legislation. A Washington
statute17 extends the: right of appeal to either the commission, any pub'&
5Ibid.
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1112(k) "...
from the decision of
said utilities commissioner, or the said utilities commission, any party to said
proceedings may appeal to the superior court. .. "
The first case decided under this statute was Utilities Commission v. Carolina
Coach Co., 216 N. C. 325, 4 S. E. (2d) 897 (1939). The Coach Co. had
petitioned the -commission for removal of certain restrictions in its franchise.
The Greyhound Bus Co. intervened and protested, and the petition was denied.
The Coach Co. appealed, and the protestant moved to dismiss the appeal on the
ground that the order affected no property right of the appellants. It was held
that C. S. §1097 does not confine the right of appeal to matters of property right.
It was also pointed out that C. S. §1112(k) uses the most general language
possible.
The protestants were relying on the Bus Law, N. C. Pub. Laws, c. 136, §8,
saying that appeal lay from an order of the commission to suspend, revoke, alter
or amend _ny franchise of a bus company.' The argument was that since the
commission in this proceeding refused to allow any change in the franchise, no
property right was affected, and no right of appeal lay. The court said, "We do
not believe that: upon,'a fair interpretation" of the law the right of appeal was intended.to be confined to the single instance pointed out, or that appeal in any
other instance is unprovided for by the statute on the theory expressio inius est
exclusio alterius. Such an inferential conclusion would violate the rules of liberal
construction, which we think ought to. be given to procedural laws protecting
property rights." 216 N. C"325, 328 4 S., E. (2d) 897, 899 (1939), reajlned in
218 N. C 233, 10 S. E. (2d) 824 (140).
116State v. Rock Island Mbtor Transit Co., 209 Minn. 108, 295 N. W. 519

(1940).
State v. Tri-State Telephone -and. Telegraph Co.; 146 Minn. 247, 178 N. W.
603 (1920); is a case,.whichlmight be said to support the position of the court in
the principal case if the Minnesota case were not based on a statute peculiar to that
state. In that case the city of St. Paul was denied the right of appeal from a
proceeding before the Railroad and Warehouse Commission to determine the
reasonableness of telephone rates. However, it was said that the statute, Gen.
Laws of- Minn 1915, c. 152, §22, gave the right of appeal only to those who have
been made parties by law, -wh6 have a right -to control the proceeding, and who
are bound by the order. The fact that the city was affected by the order did not
make
1 7 it a party.
Rmsa STATUTEs OF WASHINGTON (Remington, 1931) §10430.
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lic service company, or any complainant. Indiana 8 allows appeal by
any person, association, or city adversely affected. In Oklahoma, a
constitutional provision19 gives the right of appeal to any corporation
affected, any person deeming himself aggrieved, or the state.
It seems improbable that the North Carolina legislature intended to
limit the right of appeal as it was limited in the principal case. As is
20
pointed out above, it appears that the best law is against that holding. *
However, the precedents to which the courts must look for guidance in
construing the statutes being as conflicting as they are, it would seem
advisable for the legislature to change the law so as clearly to give the
right of appeal to either the defendant corporation, the state, or any
affected person appearing before the commission and participating in
the hearing regardless of a showing of a property interest.
EDWIN N. MANER, JR.
Constitutional Law-Racial Discrimination-Discriminatory
Salary Schedules of Negro Schoolteachers Prohibited
by Fourteenth Amendment
Plaintiff, a negro schoolteacher, brought an action for a declaratory
judgment as to the legality of the action of the Board of Education of
Nashville, Tennessee, in setting up different schedules of compensation
f6r white and colored teachers of the same professional rating, for injunction against such future discrimination, and for past salary alleged
to be due on the basis of the difference between the white and the colored schedules. The federal district court made findings of fact that
the board had followed the schedules, that the only basis for the different scales was race or color, and held that such a distinction was a
denial of equal protection of laws and so violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The declaratory judgment and the injunction were granted, but
recovery of back salary was denied because the negro plaintiff had
accepted the smaller amount in the past without protest. 1
The instant case provides one more step in the slow advancement of
18 Acts "of Indiana 1927, c. 258, §1.
OKaLA. CoNsT.,

Art. IX, §20.

'0. Corporation Commission v. Cannon Mfg. Co., 185 N. C. 17, 116 S. E. 178
(1923). The Southern Power Co. -petitioned the Corporation Commission to fix
reasonable rates. On the filing of the petition, the commission had notices issued
and served on all customers under contract with the petitioner. Various customers
appeared and objected to the proposed rates. From the commission's decision, the
customers were allowed an appeal. (Appeal dismissed on other grounds.)
In State ex ret. Board of Railroad Commissioners v. Wilmington and Weldon
R. R. Co., 122 N. C. 877, 29 S. E. 334 (1898), the petitioners had begun a proceeding before the commission to require the railroad to build a station. From
the commission's finding, the petitioners appealed directly to the supreme.court.
It was held that the appeal would lie to the superior court and then to the supreme
court.
'Thomas v. Hibbitts, 46 F. Supp. 368 (M. D. Tenn. 1942).
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the negro in the South as a result of the protection afforded by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 2 The question presented
here, however, is not a new one. It first arose in Maryland in 1939,
where a negro teacher sought to enjoin the enforcement of a state
statute setting up similar discriminatory salary schedules. Although
the case was first dismissed for want of parties,5 the court on second
suit granted an injunction to the extent the statute authorized and the
board of education carried out a purely racial discrimination. 4* The
court, recognizing the possibility of differences in the individuals themselves, said that salaries for the two races did not have to be equal, but
that it would be hard to find any legal justification for paying a negro
teacher less than the minimum required for a white teacher of the same
standard professional qualifications and experience, for such difference
in pay would seem to be clearly based solely on race or color. Herein
seems to lie the whole crux of the problem, for where, as here, there
are definite professional standards by which the worth of the teacher
may be measured, an almost prima facie case of racial discrimination
arises, whereas if the standard was that of the skill or innate ability
of the individual teacher such a discrimination would be less apparent.s*
The doctrine of the Maryland case has been incorporated into two other
degisions besides the instant caseO* so that it would now appear to be
settled law that wherever a county or state board of education sets up
different salary schedules for white and colored teachers there is a
prima facie case of discrimination solely on the basis of race or color.
In the instant case, the defense argued that the different economic
positions of the white and colored teachers, which allowed the latter to
'U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV, §1.
' Mills v. Lowndes, 26 F. Supp. 792 (D. Md. 1939). This action was brought
against the members of the state board of education, and the court held that
although the state fixed the basic salary schedules the county board of education
was an indispensable party to the suit because it administered them.
" Mills v. Board of Education of Anne Arundel County, 30 F. Supp. 245
(D. Md. 1939). The court refused to declare the statei statute unconstitutional
on its face, for it was the county practice rather than the mere terms of the
statute which prejudiced the plaintiff. This was on the theory that the state only
fixed the minimum salaries and the actual salaries were in the discretion of the
county board. It would seem that since the payment of teachers' salaries is generally a local matter any suit of this nature would have to join the county board
of education as defendant.
5"See Notes (1940) 27 VA. L. REv. 245, (1940) 3 LA. L. Rav. 232, (1941) 1
BILL OF RIGHTs Rv. 142 to the effect that cases involving discriminations as to
teachers salaries should not be precedents for holding unconstitutional any wage
discriminations against non-professional groups.
"Alston v. School Board of City of Norfolk, 112 F. (2d) 992, 130 A. L. R.
1506 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940). The action was dismissed in the district court on the
ground that the plaintiff's entry into a contract with the school board to teach
for a year at a fixed price constituted a waiver of such constitutional rights as
he was seeking. The court held that if the rights were waived it was only for the
term of the contract and thus the question was still pertinent as to future rights.
McDaniel v. Board of Public Instruction, 39 F. Supp. 638 (N. D. Fla. 1941).
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live more cheaply, and the fact that colored teachers were more numerous and could be employed at lower salaries, justified the lower rates of
pay. This defense was recognized as being good in the abstract, but
the court gave considerable import to the fact that even though the use
of colored teachers would be more economical there was no showing
that they were used in white schools, and therefore the defense was held
invalid.7 Such would still seem to be so even if the teachers were used
interchangeably, for then, in addition to the same professional qualifications, there would-be the same type of work, making a stronger case
for equal pay. Also there is no sociological justification for giving legal
significance to the fact that the negroes' low standard of living allows
them to live more cheaply, and it would seem that the Fourteenth
Amendment should extend to the prevention of any state action which
tends to perpetuate a negro standard of living which is lower than that
of whites. The increasing importance of the state as an employer,
which results in employment of many different types of labor,8 intensifies this need for racial protection.
There seem to be no cases involving a state discrimination as to
wages of other kinds of workers.9* This is probably due to the fact that
there is no other definite class which includes both colored and white persons where such definite wage scales are set up. However, the budgetary
problems of the counties require the setting. up of these wage rates. If
the counties changed from these schedules based on education and years
of experience to some standard less objective, or even dropped the schedules entirely, the prima facie case of discrimination would seem to disappear. Proof of discrimination would then probably require a showing
of systematic and continuous differences in the wages, or that the colored teachers were not being paid on substantially the same basis as
the whites.
The first of these proofs would be analogous to the test set up in
-determining whether due process has been denied in the trial of a negro
7 Thonas

v. Hibbitts, 46 F. Supp. 368, 370 (M.D. Tenn. 1942).
sSee Note (1940) 53 HAnv. L. REv. 669 discussing the limitations on the state
as an employer under the Fourteenth Amendment.
"*The only cases analogous in this respect to the instant decision involve
limitations placed by the state or its municipalities upon the letting of a public
contract. In Heim v. McCall, 239 U. S. 175, 36 S. Ct. 78, 60 L. ed. 218 (1915),
the court held that a statute providing that a public contractor could not hire

aliens was constitutional as a proper exercise of control over public works. Also
see Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207, 24 S. Ct. 124, 51 L. ed. 1047 (1903) to the
effect that a state could insert hour limitations into public contracts, and People
v. City of Chicago, 278 Ill. 318, 116 N. E. 158 (1917) where it was held con-

stitutional for a board of education to deny employment to teachers who were
union members. These cases seem to be contrary to the attitude of the teachers'
salary cases in that they allow the state to impose restrictions on the hiring of
public employees without considering such restrictions a denial of equal protection
of the laws.
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defendant before a wholly white jury. In such case it must be determined'whether there has been a long continuous, systematic and arbitrary exclusion of the negroes solely on the basis of race or color, and
not whether there was an exclusion of negro jurors at that particular
trial.' 0
The second method of showing discrimination would seem to more
closely follow the test set up by the courts as to whether there has been
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by discrimination between
white and colored children in other fields of education. The question
there is not whether the facilities provided for each are actually equal,
but whether they are substantially equal. The leading case on this point
is State of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, in which the Supreme
Court of the United States held that the state of Missouri was bound
to furnish within its borders facilities for negro legal education substantially equal to those which"it there afforded the white race, whether
or not any negroes other than the plaintiff sought the same opportunity."" This case, however, may be somewhat limited in its application of the substantial equality doctrine in that at the time of the suit
there was no intrastate legal education for negroes provided by the state
at all, and thus the court did not go into a comparison of facilities. The
extent of the holding was that scholarships to law schools without the
state were not sufficient to meet the requirements of substantial equality.
In this respect the decision may be strengthened by the interpretation
placed upon it by the Supreme Court of Missouri on remand that the
law school facilities for negroes at Lincoln University would have to
be substantially the same as those provided for whites by the beginning
of the next term.' 2* This opinion was respected in a later federal case
in announcing that the opinion in the Gaines case "did not deprive the
state of a reasonable opportuhity to provide facilities demanded for the
first time, before it abrograted its established policy of segregation."' 3'
oNorris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587, 55 S. Ct. 579, 79 L. ed. 1074 (1935). Even
though there were no definite schedules set up, it would seem that if the plaintiff
could show that for a long time there had been systematic-wage differences he
would have a case of discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment.
1- 305 U. S. 337, 59 S. Ct.232, 83 L. ed. 208 (1938) ; accord, Pearson v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 At]. 590, 103 A. L. R. 706 (1936) holding that where
Maryland provided for outside scholarships there was a denial of substantial
equality.
'"State ex reL. Gaines v. Canada(, 344 Mo. 1238, 131 S. W. (2d) 217 (1939).
Since the rendition of the Gaines decision the state had enacted legislation charging
the curators of the negro institution of higher education, Lincoln University, with
a mandatory duty to erect any additional buildings and provide for any additional
facilities which might be requested. This new statute probably influenced the
court to allow a reasonable time for the school to provide the facilities before a
mandamus could be obtained which would permit the, petitioner to enter the white
law school.
I" Bluford v. Canada, 32 F. Supp. 707 (W. D. Mo. 1940). The negro plaintiff
had been denied admission to the graduate school of journalism at the University
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The doctrine that the facilities provided for white and colored children must be substantially equal has also been widely recognized
throughout those'states which follow a policy of racial segregation for
educational purposes. The rule is well stated in a leading Kansas case:
"Any classification which preserves substantially equal school advantages is not prohibited by either the state or the federal Constitution,
nor would it contravene the provisions of either."' 14 Under this doctrine, where the negroes had to walk a greater distance to school than
the whites,15 where a new building was being erected for white students
but not for colored,'e " where a negro girl was not allowed to room in
the same Home Economics House with the white students, 17. and where
the negroes were given no representation on the board of education of
the district,1 8 it was held that the facilities were substantially equal and
thus no discrimination existed. On the other hand, where the colored
and white children attended school for the same total number of years,
but different numbers of years were allotted to grammar, junior high,
and high schools,'9* where the curriculum in the white school included
of Missouri (white) and was bringing action for damages against the registrar.
There was, however, no allegation in the complaint of application and refusal at
Lincoln University (colored) before the suit was brought, and the court said
such demand and refusal would have to be shown before there could be any
recovery. The court considered that the opinion in the Gaines case should not
imply that the state had to abrogate its racial segregation policy for the short
time required to set up the negro facilities.
1
,Reynolds v. Board of Education, 66 Kan. 672, 72 Pac. 274 (1903).
1
Lehew v. Brummell, 103 Mo. 546, 15 S. W. 765, 11 L. R. A. 828 (1891);
accord, Dameron v. Bayless, 14 Ariz. 180, 126 Pac. 273 (1912).
Lowery v. School Trustees, 140 N. C. 33, 52 S. E. 267 (1905). Since there
were 307 white children and only 68 colored children it was found that the erection
of the building for additional accommodation of white children was necessary,
but that the building for colored children was amply sufficient and commodious.
State v. Board of Trustees, 126 0. St. 290, 185 N. E. 196 (1933).. The
plaintiff was offered quarters and opportunity to pursue her residence service in
such house in one of its compartments which was furnished and equipped in an
equivalent and similar manner as the compartments which she wanted to enter with
the white students, and the court held that she was not being denied educational;but
merely social, privileges. In Jones v. Newlon, 81 Col. 25, 253 Pac. 386, 50 A. L. R.
1263 (1927), it was held that exclusion of colored pupils from the swimming pool
and entertainments and other social functions was a violation of a Colorado constitutional provision that no classification of pupils should be made because of
race or color; accord, Patterson v. Board of Education of City of Trenton, 11
N. J. Misc. 179, 164 Atl. 892 (1933), aff'd, 112 N. J.L. 99, 169 Atl. 690 (1934).
It would seem then that in states which do not follow a policy of segreg4tiog
mere separations as to social functions would constitute illegal discrimination.
" State v. Albritton, 98 Okla. 158, 224 Pac. 511 (1924). It was held that even
though there was a majority of negro students in the district the determination
of whether the board was to be composed of white or colored members was in
the discretion of the superintendent of schools, and since there was no showing that
the action of the superintendent resulted in unequal accommodations, there was
no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
10* Graham v. Board of Education of Topeka, "153 Kan. 840, 114 P. (2d) '313
(1941). The court went into the method of teaching in each ot the schools,
showing that the junior high school for white children was departmentalized and
had different teachers for each course, but that such was not the case in the
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mechanical and other special instruction not given in the colored
school,20 where the county was authorized to establish one agricultural
high school for white youth and support it by a tax on all taxable property,21 and where the negro children had to cross dangerous railroad
tracks to get to school, 22 it was held that there were such substantial
inequalities as constituted a racial discrimination. From these cases it
is seen that, given a policy of segregation of races by the state for education, compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment depends upon whether
the facilities provided for each race are substantially the same. The
courts also seem to apply this criterion in all the teacher salary cases.
They evidently recognize that even though a definite schedule exists the
individual salaries need not be exactly equal, but that a discriminatory
schedule would show prima fade that the wage classification is determined by race or color and thus that a violation of the substantial
equality doctrine would exist. If then there were no schedules, the
negro plaintiff would have the burden of showing that his wages were
not being determined in substantially the same way as those of the white
teachers. The proof of such contention would require consideration of
the ability, efficiency, skill, experience and educational qualifications of
the individual teacher and the type of students and courses taught,
whereas the salary schedules -are based solely upon his experience- and
education.
North Carolina has a constitutional provision which requires that
the races shall be separated for purposes of education, but that there
shall be no discrimination against either,23 and such segregation has
long been the policy of the state.24* This provision has been recognized
as not requiring exact equality of school advantages, but only that the
facilities be substantially the same in view of the varying needs of the
two races. 25* North Carolina then would seem to be in accord with
negro seventh and eighth grades.

See Note (1942)

10 J. B. A. KAN. 285 dis-

cussing the tendency of Kansas to require absolute rather than substantial equality.
'0Jones v. Board of Education, 90 Okla. 233, 217 Pac. 400 (1923).
1 McFarland v. Goins,. 96 Miss. 67, 50 So. 493 (1909).
2
Williams v. Board of Education, 79 Kan. 202, 99 Pac. 216 (1908).
"' N. C. CoxsT., Art. IX, §2. "....

and the children of the white race and the

children of the colored race shall be taught in separate public schools; but there
shall be no discrimination in favor of, or to the prejudice of, either race."
2 * Although the constitutional and statutory provisions relate only to public
schools, it has been the policy to extend them to higher education also. N. C.
CODE
ANN. (Michie, 1939) §5384. See Note 17 N. C. L. REv. 280 (1939).
25
"Lowery-v. School Trustees, 140 N. C. 33, 52 S. E. 267 (1905). The doctrine which requires facilities and advantages to be substantially equal was probably first recognized by the North Carolina court in McMillan v. School Committee,
107 N. C. 609, 615, 12 S.E. 330, 331 (1890) where it quotes from an Ohio case
which advanced the doctrine. In two earlier cases, Pruit v. Commissioners, 94
N. C. 709 (1886), and Rigsbee v. Durham, 94 N. C. 800 (1886) the court held
that where the poll and property taxes collected from whites were to be devoted
to sustaining schools for white persons, and the taxes collected from negroes were
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most other states in this respect, and should a case arise in its courts
involving salary discriminations between colored and white teachers it
would be possible to decide the case under the substantial equality
doctrine.
The problem of the instant case is still very much alive throughout
the Southern states, for statistics of comparative colored and white teachers' salaries for 1935-1936 in seventeen states show that for every $1.00
paid to white teachers only about $.50 was paid to colored. 26 North
Carolina seems to be somewhat more liberal than the average, the ratio
at that time being $.67 to the negro per $1.00 to the white, 27 and in
1940-1941 $.79,to the negro for each $1.00 per white.2 8 * The general
policy of North Carolina evidently seeks to bring about an equalization
of teachers' saliries, 29* but there is still some room for improvement.
It would seem that unless complete minimum equalization is achieved a
suit for injunction against such discrimination is likely to arise which,
if successful, would impose a critical and sudden strain on the educa-

tional budget.

C. D.

HOGUE, JR.

Mortgages and Deeds of Trust-Statute of Limitations Barring
Foreclosures and Right of Redemption-Nature
of Possession Required
Civil action in ejectment.1 The facts were agreed to be as follows:
The plaintiff, in the year 1925, executed a deed of trust securing notes
made by him for the balance due on the purchase price of the land
covered by the trust deed. The last of the notes matured in 1928. In
1938, more than ten years after the maturity date of the last note, the
trustee foreclosed and conveyed the land to defendant by exercising the
power of sale contained in the trust instrument. No payment of either
principal or interest was ever made on any of the notes.
to be used for colored schools, the tax was discriminatory and void under the
state constitution.
" Special Problems of Negro Education (Wilkerson, 1939). Prepared for
Advisory Committee on Education, Staff Study Number 12. Published by United

States Government Printing Office, p. 24, Table.
2"Ibid.

*State School Facts (Feb., 1942), Vol. XIV, No. 5, Table II. From this
table it is seen that there has been a continuous increase in all salaries throughout

the years and also a more rapid increase in negro wages than in white wages.
There has thus been a tendency to equalize the salaries. This table does not
show the exact situation, for it only covers salaries paid from state funds, and
those paid by the individual counties might make some difference.
8* See Greensboro Daily News, June 12, 1942, §1, p. 12, col. 2, stating that
there was a $242,000 appropriation in 1942 for the purpose of furthering the
equalization of teachers' salaries, and that the State School Commission hopes to

have all differences between colored and white teachers' salaries abolished within
two or three years.
I Ownbey v. Parkway Properties, Inc., 222 N. C. 54, 21 S.E. (2d) 900 (1942).
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Plaintiff contended that the trustee's sale was void, the power of
sale having been barred by lapse of time under the following North
Carolina statutes: (1) "The power of sale of real property contained
in any mortgage or deed of trust for the benefit of creditors shall become inoperative, and no person shall execute any such power, when an
action to foreclose such mortgage or deed of trust for the benefit of
creditors would be barred by the statute of limitations."'2 (2) The
statute of limitations relating to foreclosures: "For the foreclosure of
a mortgage, or deed in trust for creditors with a power of sale, of real
property, where the mortgagor or grantor has been in possession of the
property, within ten years after the forfeiture of the mortgage, or after
the power of sale became absolute, or within ten years after the last
'3
payment on the same."
It will be noted -that these statutes bar a power of sale or a foreclosure only when the grantor or mortgagor has been in possession
during the ten-year period. Plaintiff admitted that he had not been in
actual possession, but prosecuted his claim on the basis of constructive
possession, which he alleged to rest in him as the owner of the legal title
to the premises.
The North Carolina Supreme Court, affirming the trial court's
judgment for defendant, held that plaintiff did not have such constructive possession, since the legal title to mortgaged real property or
real property deeded in trust passes to the mortgagee or trustee under
the North Carolina rule as to the effect of such conveyances. Thus,
under the instant decision, a mortgagor or grantor in a trust deed must
show that he has been in actual possession of the premises in order to
claim a bar of foreclosure or of a power of sale under these statutes.
North Carolina has consistently followed the "title" theory in regard
to mortgages and deeds of trusts, i.e., the theory that the execution of
these instruments vests the legal title in the mortgagee or trustee 4 for
the purpose of security.5 * The majority of jurisdictions adhere to the
so-called "lien" theory.0 Under this doctrine the legal title remains in
the grantor, and the grantee takes only a lien on the property.
2 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §2589.

IN. C.

CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §437(3).
'Riddick v. Davis, 220 N. C. 120, 16 S. E. (2d) 662 (1941) ; Alexander v.
Virginia Carolina joint Stock Land Bank, 201 N. C. 449, 160 S. E. 460 (1931) ;
Weathersbee v. Goodwin, 175 N. C. 234, 95 S. E. 491 (1918); Jones v. Williams,
155 N. C. 179, 71 S. E. 222 (1911) ; Kiser v. Combs, 114 N. C. 640,.19 S. E. 664
(1894); Wittkowski v. Watkins, 84 N. C. 457 (1881); London v. Bear, 84 N. C.
266 (1881) ; 1 JONES, MORTGAGES (7th ed. 1915) §45.
I*Bank of Onslow v. Rowland Lumber Company, 193 N. C. 757, 138 S. E.
125 (1927) (holding that payment for extension of time under a contract granting
right to remove timber should be made to mortgagor, rather than to one who
became mortgagee after the execution of the original contract, since the mortgagee
has the title for purpose of security only).
1 JONES, MORTGAGES (7th ed. 1915) §17.
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In view of the firmness with which the "title" theory is established
in this state, it is difficult to understand how the plaintiff hoped to succeed in this action by arguing that he had constructive possession.
Under a North Carolina statute,7 * the owner of the legal title is presumed to be in possession of premises unless it is made to appear that
another has been in possession. Thus, constructive possession would
be in the mortgagee or trustee and not in the mortgagor or grantor.8
The first North Carolina statute relating to the time within which
foreclosure proceedings had to be brought was passed in 1826. 9 This
statute created a presumption of payment of the debt which arose ten
years after forfeiture or last payment on the debt.. It also provided
that the mortgagor's right to redeem would be presumed to have been
abandoned if not exercised within the same period. There was no
stipulation that either should be in possession in order that the statute
bar the other's right to foreclose or redeem, but the Supreme Court of
North Carolina held that possession was necessary to effect a bar. 10
In 1868, the law reached its present form."1 In an early case involving the same problem dealt with in the principal case, it was decided,
for the same reasons expressed in the principal case, that the statute
contemplated actual possession; and that, therefore, neither the right
to foreclose nor the right to redeem would be barred by the mere lapse
12
of time without such possession.
Looking at the development of the law as laid down by the foregoing
cases and statutes, it is interesting to speculate as to whether or not the
result of the principal case would have been different if North Carolina
had been a "lien" jurisdiction. In that case, the plaintiff would have
been entitled to constructive possession under the statute.'8 Would
such possession plus lapse of time be considered sufficient to raise the
bar of the statute? The writer thinks not. Only two cases involving
this point have arisen in "lien" jurisdictions. One, a Minnesota case,
said, by way of dictum, that the constructive possession which followed
the legal title of the mortgagor would be sufficient to bar the right to
foreclose after lapse of the required time. 14 The other, a Missouri

" N. C.

CODE ANN.

(Michie, 1939) §432 (erroneously cited in the principal

case as N. C CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §422).
' Crews v. Crews, 192 N. C. 679, 135 S. E. 784 (1926) ; Stevens v. Turlington,

186 N. C. 191, 119 S.E. 210 (1923); Weathersbee v. Goodwin, 175 N. C. 234,

95 S.E. 491 (1918); London v. Bear, 84 N. C. 266 (1881).
'N. C. Pub. Laws 1826, c. 28, §2, N. C. REv. CODE (Little, Brown & Co.,
1854) c. 65, §19.
"0Simmons v. Ballard, 102 N. C. 105, 9 S. E. 495 (1889).
'IN. C. CODE OF Civi. PRocEnuaR (1868) §31(3-4), N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie,
1939) §437(3-4), cited supra note 3.
' Woodlief v. Wester, 136 N. C. 162, 48 S. E. 578 (1904).
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §432, cited =ipra note 7.
N
"'See Bradley v. Norris, 63 Minn. 156, 168, 65 N. W. 357, 360 (1895).
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case, held that only actual possession would raise the bar, but was
decided on the theory that adverse possession could bar foreclosure
rather than under a statute of limitations barring foreclosures." 5
It would seem that the statute contemplates actual rather than constructive possession for the following reasons: (1) It has been established that, under our statute barring the mortgagor's right to redeem
after ten years where the mortgagee has been in possession,' 6 the possession must be actual.17 This conclusion has been reached despite the
fact that the mortgagee admittedly has constructive possession. If constructive possession will not bar the right to redeem, it is unlikely that
constructive possession would be held to bar the reciprocal right to
foreclose. (2) Although the present statute of limitations on foreclosure' 8 does not create a presumption of payment as did the original
statute, 19 the erroneous idea that the bar is based on a presumption of
20
payment has persisted even down to the time of the principal case.
There is nothing in the nature of constructive possession which logically should give rise to such a presumption. Constructive possession
is but an academic legal concept. Actual possession, on the other hand,
is a fact, and one on which a presumption of a right to continue in
possession might well be based. Thus, it is almost certain that the
legislators who saw fit to have the bar raised by the coexistence of two
elements, i.e., lapse of time plus possession, were thinking in terms of
actual possession.
Previous to the enactment of the statute barring a power of sale in
a mortgage or trust deed when an action to foreclose would be
barred, 21 it was held that a power of sale would not be barred by the
statutes relating to actions to foreclose. It was reasoned that the statutes of limitation barred only "actions," and that the exercise of a power
of sale was not an "action" within the meaning of the statutes. Mortgagees and trustees under instruments containing a power of sale could,
therefore, enforce their security by sale after the action to foreclose was
barred. 22 The statute barring powers of sale prevents such action now.
It is not a mere statute of limitations which must be pleaded. Rather,
23
it is a mandatory expression of legislative will.
Qty
10 G
'
'

of St. Louis v. Priest, 103 Mo. 652, 15 S. W. 988 (1890).
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §437(4).
Crews v. Crews, 192 N. C. 679. 135 S. E. 784 (1926).

N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §437(3), cited mspra notes 3 and 11.
C. RZEV. CODE (Little, Brown & Co., 1854) c. 65, §19.

1N.

'20See Ownbey y. Park~iay Properties, Inc., 222 N. C.

54, 56, 21 S. E. (2d)

900, 902 (1942), cited supra note 1.
"N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §2589, cited supra note 2.
"Miller v. Coxe, 133 N. C. 578, 45 S. E. 940 (1903); Cone v. Hyatt, 132
N. C. 810, 44 S. E. 678 (1903) ; Menzel v. 'Hinton, 132 N. C. 660, 44 S. E. 385

(1903).
" Spain v. Hines, 214 N. C. 432, 200 S. E. 25 (1938).
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Attention is called to the following statement inadvertently made by
the court in the case under discussion: "The mortgagor has no constructive possession and if he is not in actual possession the statute runs
against and bars his right of redemption if he fails to act within the
ten-year period." 24 This, of course, is not true unless the mortgagee is
in actual possession. Where no one is in possession neither the right
to redeem nor the right to foreclose is barred.2 5 The court stated the
rule correctly farther on in the opinion. Unfortunately, the abovequoted misstatement was incorporated into the headnote in the North
CarolinaReports as being the main law of the case. The statement is
also given some attention in the headnotes in the Southeastern Reporter,
but is not emphasized.
The court showed by its statements that it was aware of the fact
that the conclusion reached in the principal case serves to make the
work of the abstracter more burdensome. He must ascertain the past
and present status of the possession before he can form a final conclusion in regard to a mortgage or trust deed which, on the record
evidence, is barred by lapse of time. The decision, however, undoubtedly interpreted the law in accord with sound principles of reasoning
and in harmony with the legislative intent.
JOEL DENTON.

u'See Ownbey v. Parkway Properties, Inc., 222 N. C. 54, 56, 21 S. E. (2d)

900, 902 (1942).

" Crews v. Crews, 192 N. C. 679, 135 S. E. 784 (1926), cited supra notes 8

and 17.

